Author: ORCID

Abstract: »India records over 6,800 rape cases with Scheduled Caste (SC) victims annually, but conviction rates remain below 35% and trial pendency exceeds 85%. This paper asks whether partisan alignment between state and central governments—the ruling party match that drives general fiscal transfers—also improves SC justice delivery: more reporting, higher conviction rates, lower pendency, and faster trial disposal. Using a state-year panel of 20 major Indian states over 2001–2022 ( N = 427), we find consistent alignment premiums across all four justice outcomes. Aligned states show higher SC rape registration rates (+4 . 2% TWFE, p < 0 . 01), higher conviction rates (+1 . 0 pp, p < 0 . 01), lower pendency ( − 1 . 1 pp, p < 0 . 001), and faster disposal times (−0.29 years, p < 0.001).
BJP–INC heterogeneity reveals a sharp divergence in the reporting channel: BJP-aligned states show substantially higher reporting (+7 . 4% TWFE, p < 0 . 01) while INC-aligned states show none (+0 . 5%, p = 0 . 82). Conviction and pendency premiums are similar across both party families. We interpret the BJP-reporting premium as consistent with both increased FIR registration pressure under BJP state governments (which may reflect electoral signalling on law-and-order) and possible under-reporting suppression in INC-governed states with stronger dominant-caste political networks.
Wild cluster bootstrap (WCB, G = 20, B = 999) confirms the pendency result (WCB 95% CI [ − 1 . 43 ,− 0 . 97]) but cannot reject zero for reporting and conviction with only 20 clusters. Results are robust to year fixed effects and state fixed effects separately.« (Source: Paper)

Contents:

	1 Introduction (p. 3)
	2 Related Literature (p. 4)
		2.1 Caste and Sexual Violence in India (p. 4)
		2.2 Partisan Transfers and Political Economy of SC Outcomes (p. 4)
		2.3 Conviction Rates and Trial Delays in India (p. 5)
	3 SC Criminal Justice Architecture (p. 5)
		3.1 SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act (p. 5)
		3.2 State Police and Central Court Administration (p. 6)
		3.3 National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) (p. 6)
	4 Data (p. 6)
		4.1 Panel Structure (p. 6)
		4.2 SC Justice Outcomes (p. 6)
		4.3 Political Variables (p. 7)
		4.4 SC Legislative Representation (p. 7)
	5 Empirical Strategy (p. 7)
		5.1 Progressive Specifications (p. 7)
		5.2 BJP–INC Heterogeneity (p. 8)
		5.3 Wild Cluster Bootstrap (p. 8)
	6 Results (p. 8)
		6.1 SC Rape Reporting (Table 1) (p. 8)
		6.2 Conviction Rate and Pendency (Table 2) (p. 9)
		6.3 Disposal Time (Table 3)(p. 9)
		6.4 BJP vs. INC: Divergent Reporting Premiums (Table 4) (p. 10)
	7 Discussion (p. 11)
		7.1 The Alignment Premium: Fiscal vs. Justice Channels (p. 11)
		7.2 Judicial Federalism and Centre–State Justice Coordination (p. 11)
		7.3 High-Profile Cases: Are They Representative? (p. 12)
		7.4 Limitations (p. 12)
	8 Conclusion (p. 12)

Wikipedia: History of Asia: History of India / History of India (1947–present) | Caste: Caste system in India / Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes | Sex and the law: Rape / Rape in India